with redistribution. My paper provides a di erent view on the impact of welfare state design. The Paradox of Redistribution is an argument about political developments at country level. Therefore, contrasting it requires exploring the link between policy design and redistribution within countries over time.
The Paradox of Redistribution Andrew Jackson / June 13, 2015 The issue of how to deal with rising inequality and the squeezed middle-class has recently moved to the centre of political debate, with the various parties proposing significant policy changes.
By a simple constructive proof, this paper shows that such a "paradox of redistribution" can always occur in any voting body if the number of voters, n, is sufficiently large. Simulation results show that the paradox is quite frequent (up to 30 percent) and increases with n (at least for small n). 2015-12-01 · In model 2 we see again a paradox of redistribution between poverty-related aid and total aid. In model 3 there is no such paradox, once we use aid transfers to multilateral donors as the dependent variable. Generosity remains robust both in terms of statistical significance and magnitude of effect. The new ‘paradox of redistribution’?-A comparative study on migrant poverty in 15 European welfare states Author: Lutz Gschwind Supervisor: Joakim Palme The paradox of redistribution and strategies of equality : welfare state institutions, inequality and poverty in the Western countries / by Walter Korpi and Joakim Palme.
In voting bodies, when voting weights are reallocated, it may be observed that the voting power of some members, as measured by the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf power indices, increases while their voting weight decreases. By a simple constructive proof, this paper shows that such a “paradox of redistribution” can always occur in any voting body if the number of voters, n, is sufficiently design. The Paradox of Redistribution is an argument about distributive politics. Therefore, contrasting it requires exploring the link between policy design and redistribution within countries over time. With this aim, I conduct a panel analysis of the redistributive impact of social transfers The Paradox of Redistribution Andrew Jackson / June 13, 2015 The issue of how to deal with rising inequality and the squeezed middle-class has recently moved to the centre of political debate, with the various parties proposing significant policy changes. Paradox of Redistribution: Legislative Overrepresentation and Regional Development in Brazil | Publius: The Journal of Federalism | Oxford Academic. Abstract.
Debates on how to reduce poverty and inequality have focused on two con- troversial questions: Should social policies be targeted to low-income groups.
THE PARADOX OF REDISTRIBUTION STRATEGIES OF EQUALITY 663 In an early critique of the emphasis on tar-geting in the U.S. policy debate, Korpi (1980a, 1983) contrasted a marginal social policy model with minimum benefits targeted at the poor with an institutional model based on universal programs intended to maintain There is a paradox of redistribution. In this paper, the paradox of redistribution is translated to system dynamics and the coherence of the theory is analyzed by a system dynamics model. The system dynamics translation results in a model that reproduces the reference modes. the Paradox of Redistribution: The more we target benefits at the poor only and the more concerned we are with creating equality via equal public transfers to all, the less likely we are to reduce Cumulatively, a large volume of spending and limited private provision is the mechanism that explains the “paradox of redistribution”: the less the countries resort to targeting through means testing, the more they reduce poverty and inequality.
2020-08-17 · Second, in line with the dynamic political arguments suggested in the Paradox, I explore the evolution of social transfers and redistribution within countries over time. Overall, countries have increased redistribution by making their transfers less pro-poor, which matches the predictions of the Paradox (see Figure 2).
The existing literature on the determinants of income redistribution has identified a ‘paradox’. Namely, that countries with a high degree of market income inequality redistribute little, which is in disagreement with the median voter theorem. Effective redistribution, they argued, resulted less from a Robin Hood logic – taking from the rich to give to the poor – than from a broad and egalitarian provision of services and transfers. Hence, the paradox: a country obtained more redistribution when it took from all to give to all than when it sought to take from the rich to help the poor.
Donors differ in the amount of official development assistance dedicated to poverty reduction. We investigate the causes of variation over time and donors by employing both a regression approach with aggregate data on bilateral aid and two short
2020-08-17 · Second, in line with the dynamic political arguments suggested in the Paradox, I explore the evolution of social transfers and redistribution within countries over time. Overall, countries have increased redistribution by making their transfers less pro-poor, which matches the predictions of the Paradox (see Figure 2). In voting bodies, when voting weights are reallocated, it may be observed that the voting power of some members, as measured by the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf power indices, increases while their voting weight decreases. By a simple constructive proof, this paper shows that such a “paradox of redistribution” can always occur in any voting body if the number of voters, n, is sufficiently
design. The Paradox of Redistribution is an argument about distributive politics. Therefore, contrasting it requires exploring the link between policy design and redistribution within countries over time.
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Social Indicators. The transfer paradox occurs when donors gain in utility while recipients lose. The phenomenon of advantageous transfers occurs when the individuals involved in "The Social Insurance Paradox." Canadian Journal of Economics and.
One of the primary justifications for legislative malapportionment—the disparity between the share of legislative seats and the share of the national population—is interregional income equalization by means of favorable allocations of resources to rural areas
2013-06-08 · The relationship between the extent of targeting and redistributive impact over a broad set of empirical specifications, country selections and data sources has in fact become a very weak one. For what it matters, targeting tends to be associated with higher levels of redistribution, especially when overall effort in terms of spending is high. Schotter, A 1982, The Paradox of Redistribution: Some Theoretical and Empirical Results.
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much is actually available for redistribution. The reasoning is that, paradoxically, in countries with selective welfare systems less resources tend to be available for redistribution because there is less widespread and less robust political support for redistribution. As a consequence, the redistributive impact of such systems tends to be smaller.
Marx, I., Salanauskaite, L., & Verbist, G. (2013). The paradox of redistribution revisited: and that it may rest in peace? Session 10, East Asia * Kyung-Sup, C. (1999) “Compressed Modernity and its Discontents: South Korean Society in countries. In this literature, the so-called paradox of redistribution figures prominently (Korpi & Palme, 1998; Mkandawire, 2005).
This article examines the relationship between legislative malapportionment, redistribution, and regional economic development. One of the primary justifications for legislative malapportionment—the disparity between the share of legislative seats and the share of the national population—is interregional income equalization by means of favorable allocations of resources to rural areas
By a simple constructive proof, this paper shows that such a "paradox of redistribution" can always occur in any voting body if the number of voters, n, is sufficiently large.
The reason is that Thus, the ‘paradox of redistribution’ process can be illustrated as: Targeted spending (a) → identity priming (b 1) → polarization in attitudes (b 2) → redistribution (c). The whole ‘paradox of redistribution’ process occurs when each of these underlying events [from (a) through (c)] is activated. The relationship between the extent of targeting and redistributive impact over a broad set of empirical specifications, country selections and data sources has in fact become a very weak one. For what it matters, targeting tends to be associated with higher levels of redistribution, especially when overall effort in terms of spending is high. Effective redistribution, they argued, resulted less from a Robin Hood logic – taking from the rich to give to the poor – than from a broad and egalitarian provision of services and transfers.